General Survey

It is only in a most imprecise sense that New Zealand can be said to have had any international relations before 1919. Apart from a possibly absent-minded attempt to open direct trade negotiations with the United States in 1870, and a trivial agitation in 1869–70 for separation from Great Britain, New Zealand's external affairs before 1919 are inter-imperial rather than international.

Her entry into the 1914–18 war was the action of a dependent country. But her participation in peace making was of a different order. The New Zealand delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, led by Massey, was accepted as a rather indeterminate subdivision of the whole British (i.e., British Empire) delegation. Massey argued obstinately and successfully for New Zealand interests. He signed the Peace Treaty in a manner that avoided the question: did New Zealand do so as an independent power or not? He himself had little time for theory and was an intense loyalist. When, back in New Zealand, he was charged with an action which assumed the essential independence of New Zealand, he denied the imputation. He had been concerned with limited, concrete objectives: a mandate conferring very full powers over Western Samoa, captured by New Zealand from Germany in 1914, and a voice in the control of phosphate-rich Nauru Island.

Others were more concerned with theory. W. Downie Stewart, a colleague of Massey, pointedly questioned the premier on this matter of independence. Sir Francis Dillon Bell, the representative at the League during the 1920s, shared Massey's loyalist conservatism but not his vagueness. He drew a lawyerlike distinction between the full status of an international power, and the partial assumption of that status for strictly limited purposes. New Zealand, he concluded, solely for the purposes of League membership consented at times to act as if she was independent.

If it should be concluded that in this period New Zealand sought to combine the advantages of dependence with those of independence and that her statesmen accordingly avoided clear definitions as if they might bite, that conclusion would be true. The clue to the ambiguity is security, and security, as the policymakers from 1919–35 agreed, was best achieved by acting the role of dutiful imperial daughter. When a change came, as it did after 1935, it was not because the security motive had been replaced by a different one, but that alternative or complementary ways of achieving security were then advocated. Nor, after 1935, did mere dutifulness any longer seem a reliable guarantee. The idea that security and British dependence could not be straightforwardly equated prevails from 1935 to the present day. It would be fair to say, in brief, that the unambiguous assumption of full international status was, whatever it might have also been, at least a new answer to the problem of national security.

The Labour Government, between 1935 and 1939, exhibited both the idealism of the left and the practicality of the rulers of a small nation. They supported the League because the League stood for peace (a conclusion towards which Coalition leaders had also significantly advanced by 1935), and peace, in itself a high ideal, was also an avenue to security. In these years the United Kingdom Government followed policies in respect to Japan, Germany, and Italy, which, to the New Zealand Labour Government, seemed risky and even immoral. They turned to the League as the fountainhead of international morality, and to the concept of collective security as the surest guarantee of New Zealand's, and all small nations', integrity. Accordingly, within the League New Zealand and Great Britain sometimes took opposite sides, notably over the question of Italian aggression in Ethiopia. While New Zealand, perhaps unrealistically, advocated firm collective action, Great Britain accepted the course of “great power” negotiation outside the League, leading eventually to a recognition of the Italian conquest.

The events of these years, during which New Zealand can be said to have come of age internationally, do not imply any weakening of the ties between Great Britain and New Zealand. Loyalty was amply demonstrated when war broke out in 1939 and New Zealand unhesitatingly joined Great Britain. But New Zealand fought this war as an ally; her forces were ultimately under the control of her own Government, though commonly that Government yielded to the requests of the senior partners in the Grand Alliance.

The year 1942, when Japan attacked in the Pacific, marks another departure. For a few months in 1942 New Zealand was defenceless; when the rescue came it was American, not British, thus palpably demonstrating an already plain fact. Security was something the United Kingdom, during a world conflict, could no longer guarantee in the Pacific Ocean. Subsequent developments in New Zealand international relations stem, in considerable part, from the implications of this fact.

By the mid-twentieth century the realities of international life had impressed themselves indelibly. Remoteness and vulnerability to any threat in the Pacific has alarmed politicians since the later nineteenth century; the might of the Empire and the navy had been set in the scale against the menaces. In the 1920s there were protests against British Government disarmament proposals; in the 1930s British guarantees against Japanese aggression were sought and secured. In 1942 the embattled British Government tried in vain to fulfil them; New Zealand's integrity was preserved by the United States.

The ANZUS Treaty, signed in 1951, was the consequence. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States here undertake to defend each other against attack. For New Zealand and Australia the power to be feared was Japan, which the United States wished to rehabilitate quickly as a counter to the Communist threat in Asia. The treaty continues as a protection from that threat. This dependence upon America as a Pacific power, rather than upon the British connection, has become the cornerstone of New Zealand's international relations.

New Zealand and the Commonwealth

From the British Empire, to the British Commonwealth, and then to the unqualified Commonwealth of Nations is a process of gradual evolution, with few prominent signposts to mark significant changes of direction. The overall process is straightforward enough, however. By the latter part of the nineteenth century a group of British colonies with substantial settler populations had achieved self-government internally, and some were reaching for self-determination in external policy. In the twentieth century, temporarily as it proved in both cases, the Union of South Africa and Southern Ireland were added to their number. During the period between the two World Wars, 1919–39, it became clear that these British countries (no longer called colonies, but normally designated “dominions” after 1907) in fact exercised considerable autonomy in international affairs and were (in this period Canada and Ireland especially) intent upon completing this process. In short, something now known as “dominion status” needed definition. This came in 1926 when such countries within the Commonwealth (including Great Britain) were described by the Balfour Report as fully self-governing, in no way dependent upon each other, and linked only through common allegiance to the British Crown. In 1931 this description was enshrined in the Imperial Statute of Westminster, the ornamental coping stone, rather than the foundation stone, of the British Commonwealth. Thus the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and (briefly) Ireland were united in an association of equals (as far as status is concerned). The union, which thus survived dependence, was partly commercial, through imperial preference, partly ideological, through similar forms of government and (in greater or lesser degree) similar traditions stemming from Great Britain and Ireland, and very largely sympathetic, through a tie of loyalty and sentiment centring upon the British Crown and the British people.

The part New Zealand played in this evolution from Empire to Commonwealth was typically subdued, as she followed, sometimes willingly enough, sometimes with grave forebodings, the course set by her larger and more strident sisters, especially Canada, where a substantial French-descended part of the population was a permanent check upon identification with Great Britain. At the series of conferences which came to be called Imperial Conferences (those of 1887 and 1897 are properly labelled “colonial”) and in her relations with Great Britain, New Zealand did at times manifest a certain intransigence, notably during Seddon's premiership. This intransigence, particularly when it arose from problems of imperial trade, imperial defence, and British policy in the Pacific Ocean, expressed a determination to make imperial relations work to New Zealand advantage in trade privileges, in defence arrangements, and in territorial aggrandisement in the Pacific. New Zealand, however, did not take the lead in demanding recognition of changes in status.

When this recognition came in the late 1920s, New Zealand's reaction was one of apprehensive reluctance. Just as Massey had been unwilling to accept the implications of his actions at the Peace Conference, so Coates and Forbes were loath to grasp the status conferred by the Statute of Westminster. New Zealand's representatives had certainly taken part in the conferences which led up to this statute, but they acted as if they were merely acceding to demands made by regrettably independent-minded Canadians and Irishmen, demands which would have been best unmade. So the Statute was not adopted by New Zealand until 1947, by which time it was about to be outmoded by even more revolutionary developments.

It could not be said that New Zealand permitted herself to be hampered by her determination to ignore the Statute. Throughout the 1930s, though formally dependent, she acted as a power in no way hampered by the British connection, and her eventual adoption of the Statute came only as a legalistic tidying-up measure – a step which made it proper to do what had already been done.

The third step in the Empire-Commonwealth evolution, that from the British Commonwealth to the Commonwealth of Nations (qualified by no limiting adjective), came after the 1939–45 war when the United Kingdom set about “demantling” her colonial empire. Indian independence in 1947 was the massive prelude to a development which transformed the Commonwealth from a group of largely British nations clustered about the Crown into an association of nations of many races, many of them republics which recognised in the monarch no more than an undefined and indefinable “Head of the Commonwealth”. The new nations which have emerged from British possessions in Asia and Africa have seen allegiance to the Crown as incompatible with their national aspirations; accordingly, this compromise formula has been hit upon so that they might retain membership of the Commonwealth. It is legitimate to inquire what, if anything, Commonwealth membership of this sort means.

This is a process in which New Zealand could do no more than acquiesce, but it is worth stressing that her traditional sympathetic identification with the United Kingdom and with the Empire-Commonwealth encouraged her to extend a warm welcome to new nations which opted for membership of this kind. New Zealand was glad not to have to think of India as a foreign country, and has subsequently welcomed Pakistan, Ceylon, and Ghana. On a different level her politicians at least were sorry to see that the “republic within the Commonwealth” formula did not prove elastic enough to keep South Africa within the fold.

As the second half of the twentieth century opens New Zealand is more grateful for the continuance of the Commonwealth than sure of its meaning. Internationally, regional cooperation, for instance, through ANZUS and SEATO, means more than meetings of Commonwealth heads of government; in the South Pacific the well-established habit of acting in foreign policy matters with Australia has a tradition of its own; in South-East Asian affairs the Colombo Plan and SEATO do not differentiate between members and non-members of the Commonwealth. And even that last tangible vestige of the Empire-Commonwealth, preferential trade relations, are endangered as Great Britain moves closer to the E.E.C. If New Zealand is left with nothing but the intangibles it may prove that she will be left with nothing at all. The American connection, though inescapable, is less comfortable than the British; ANZUS does not necessarily oblige the United States to act in New Zealand's defence. Probably the great majority of New Zealanders today regret the decline of British power in the Pacific which has entailed dependence upon the United States which, though friendly, is a foreign country.

Seato

The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation was set up as a result of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, which New Zealand signed on 8 September 1954 together with Australia, France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The background was the expansion of Communist power in South-East Asia, dramatised by the fall of Dien Bien Phu and, earlier in that year, the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. The initiative towards united action to resist such expansion came from the United States and led to an eight-government conference at Manila in August, in which New Zealand participated.

The major purposes of the Treaty and the Organisation are set out in Articles III, IV, and V. They are:

1. The promotion of economic progress and well being;

2. Action to meet armed attack against the parties to the Treaty and also against any state or territory which the parties may unanimously designate: further, the signatories are to consult about any threat short of armed attack, whether against a party to the Treaty or a designated territory, which endangers the peace of the area;

3. The establishment of a Council of Ministers to put the Treaty into effect, and especially to undertake military and any other planning.

A protocol to the treaty designated Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam under Article IV (section 2, above).

The headquarters of the Organisation were set up at Bangkok, with special committees under a body of “Council Representatives” who carry on while the Council is not in session. Council meetings have been held regularly, once (1959) in Wellington. New Zealand has taken part at all levels of the Organisation and also in combined military and naval exercises.

Not long after SEATO was set up it became clear that the Communist threat had altered from the possibility of armed attack to the actuality of infiltration, subversion, and attempts at economic domination. Accordingly, at SEATO Councils increasing stress has been placed upon the need to develop economic resources within the Treaty area to raise living standards as the surest guarantee against subversion, while maintaining defensive preparedness. New Zealand's spokesmen have tended to stress this aspect of SEATO's work and to minimise its role of direct military intervention. New Zealand offers 25 awards annually for trade trainees from SEATO countries and finances four scholarships at the Graduate School of Engineering set up by SEATO at Bangkok. Generally speaking, New Zealand has been anxious to use SEATO for purposes other than those which predominated in its creation, chiefly as an additional channel for economic and technical assistance.

The Colombo Plan

Like ANZUS and SEATO, the Colombo Plan is designed to achieve security, but its means are exclusively economic assistance to and friendship with underdeveloped countries whose enmity would be dangerous should low living standards foster the growth of communism within them. Viewed thus, the Colombo Plan is as utilitarian as ANZUS, but this conclusion does not deny the independent operation of motives of benevolence and idealism.

The Plan originated at a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held at Colombo, Ceylon, in January 1950, at which was set up a Consultative Committee which has since met annually at the capitals of the participating countries. Its purpose was to organise a cooperative effort to develop the economies and raise the living standards in the countries of South and South-East Asia. The original members were all Commonwealth countries – Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom – but since then it has been extended to include Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, the United States, Malaya, and Singapore. The Plan is administered by a Council consisting of representatives of member-governments meeting at Colombo.

There is no master plan for the whole area, but each country draws up its own development plan and itself provides the greater part of the finance involved. To implement these plans the country concerned negotiates with other member countries for capital aid and technical assistance. In the first decade over £3,000 million of aid has been thus given, chiefly by the United States, and over 18,000 people have been trained in various skills. In this period New Zealand has contributed a total of over £10 million, some £6½ million on capital aid, and has received nearly 900 trainees.

To a great extent New Zealand's assistance has taken forms which her own experience and skills have suggested: school dental service, trade and technical training, dairy and sheep farming and agriculture generally, and the processing of primary produce. In Ceylon, for example, assistance was given to establish a dental school and to train dental nurses; New Zealand also made a capital grant towards the Colombo Milk Scheme. Other schemes connected with dairying include milk collection and distribution schemes in Indian cities and contributions to dairy research and technology. Trade-training centres have been assisted in Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and Ceylon. Further, over £1 million has been granted to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, while £250,000 has gone to the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur.

In Indonesia the main form of technical assistance has been participation in an English-language teaching project, under which New Zealand experts have worked in Indonesia and Indonesian students have trained in New Zealand.

Technical assistance in the form of training provided in New Zealand brought nearly 900 trainees to New Zealand in the first 10 years, notably to study engineering, agriculture, health, technical, and general education. Others have studied at the universities in arts and science courses. Of New Zealanders serving overseas in this period, a high proportion has gone to Indonesia and Ceylon; and a great number of the total of 153 have been educationists, health and dental experts, and specialists in dairying, agriculture, and land use.

The South Pacific Commission

The later years of the Second World War were marked in Australia and New Zealand by the growth of a determination to exercise a decisive influence upon the future of the South Pacific region and to work together to secure this. The background to this resolve was the preponderant share being taken in the war against Japan by the United States and the fear consequently entertained that the Pacific Ocean might become an American lake. The upshot of this determination was the Australian and New Zealand Agreement of 1944 which, among other things, proposed the establishment of a regional advisory council for the area. In 1946 the proposal was further discussed at a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers at London, and in the same year Australia and New Zealand, acting as sponsoring powers, invited the United States, France, and the Netherlands, as powers with territorial interests in the area, to send delegates to a conference with a view to setting up such a regional organisation. As a consequence, the South Seas Conference met at Canberra in January-February 1947, with delegations from Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. From the outset political and security matters were excluded from consideration; the proposed Commission was to act in a consultative capacity on questions of welfare of the peoples in the area and social and economic development.

The agreement concluded at the Conference set up a Commission consisting of the representatives of the six governments to act as an advisory body to the participating governments on economic and social development and on the welfare and development of the native peoples. Specifically it was to prepare and recommend development measures to governments, to facilitate research into the problems of the area, and to coordinate local projects. It has subsequently set up a Research Council and a Secretariat with headquarters at Noumea in New Caledonia.

Apart from research, one of the main functions of the Commission has been the provision of facilities for discussion of common problems by representatives from the islands themselves. Three-yearly South Pacific Conferences have been held to discuss area problems and to make recommendations to the Commission. Most actual development work is carried out by member countries themselves within their own territories. The Commission provides a way of coordinating these schemes and enlists the cooperation of such international bodies as the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and UNESCO.

The United Nations

When the close of the Second World War brought the formation of the United Nations Organisation, New Zealand played an enthusiastic and modestly influential part in the process. The Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, was prominent among the small-power leaders at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 which deliberated upon the draft charter drawn up earlier by the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks. Fraser's thought on international affairs was dominated by an idealism which did not preclude calculation – world peace and New Zealand's security were complementary goals. Nor did the shrewd realism of a practical politician desert him; he recognised the ultimate decisiveness of the Great Powers' objectives.

Thus, at San Francisco New Zealand endeavoured to remove the veto from the provisions setting up the Security Council, but soon realised that the veto was the necessary price of “great power” participation. In the formative stages New Zealand's opposition to the veto arose from her desire to enhance the role of the small powers; subsequently opposition to the veto continued, but upon a different basis – from hostility to the use made by the Russians of this power. Again, New Zealand agreed with the widespread demand of the small powers which went some distance towards converting the General Assembly from an essentially advisory body into an assembly of nations capable of making decisions. Subsequently again, the General Assembly has expanded its functions at the expense of the Security Council; but this development, in its turn, owes hardly anything to the small-power idealism of 1945, and almost everything to a desire to circumvent the Russian veto in the Security Council.

Fraser's concern for social welfare, especially for that of dependent territories, was also evident at San Francisco, and he had considerable influence upon provisions setting up the Trusteeship Council. Subsequently, New Zealand, by transforming her League mandate over Western Samoa into a United Nations Trusteeship and by bringing that territory to independence in 1961, was able to illustrate the consistency with which she held the ideals advanced in 1945.

Since 1945 New Zealand's participation in the United Nations has been conscientious rather than spectacular. She has played a full part in special agencies, notably UNESCO; has once provided a President of the General Assembly in the person of Sir Leslie Munro; and once has held a non-permanent post on the Security Council. Though her vote has never been automatically cast for any particular bloc, nevertheless her judgment has been tempered by her international friendships. Though her statesmen have often lamented the exclusion of the Peking Government from the United Nations, her vote has never been cast in favour of Peking's admission. Though she has consistently deplored racial segregation, she did not formally, while South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth, join the Afro-Asian nations in their condemnation of South African racial policy. Here, and elsewhere, her attitude has been conservative and unfavourable to any attempt to use the United Nations for intervention in the domestic affairs of any member nation.

While New Zealand maintains a structure of defensive alliances, nevertheless she relies considerably upon the United Nations for the preservation of world peace. New Zealand troops served under the United Nations flag in Korea and were offered (though not accepted) for the police operations in Suez and the Congo. Such actions are a far cry from the permanent international force championed by Fraser on his return from San Francisco, and from the collective security championed earlier in the League, but they illustrate a readiness to act within an international framework.

by William Hosking Oliver, M.A.(N.Z.), D.PHIL.(OXON.), Professor of History, Massey University of Manawatu.

• New Zealand's External Relations, Larkin, T. C. (ed.) (1962)
• New Zealand and the Statute of Westminster, Beaglehole, J. C. (ed.) (1944)
• The New Zealand People at War, Political and External Affairs, Wood, F. L. W. (1958)
• This New Zealand, Wood, F. L. W. (1958).