ORIGINS

It has become increasingly difficult for an historian to know what he means when he speaks of “cause”, in view of the subtle and contradictory analyses of historical explanation by modern philosophers. The Maori Wars would offer an admirable battleground for the several theorists. The student who accepted Hume's principle of regularity which asserts (to the discomfort of most historians, who believe that they deal only with the concrete case) that it is only possible to postulate “cause” where there is multiplicity of instances, would note that the British were involved in a number of similar native wars in the nineteenth century. Following the positivist theory of the “covering law”, as framed by C. G. Hempel, he might hypothesise some law such as: “If large numbers of nineteenth century British settlers intrude among a war-like primitive people, fighting will (probably) occur”. But such a statement could scarcely be made, without the “probable”, in a law-like form. Or if the student thought of historical explanation as resting on common-sense judgments about human nature, as suggested by W. H. Walsh, his account of the origins of the Maori Wars would assume some such generalisation as: “Men are likely to fight when their livelihood and social order are threatened by a rival community”; or “Racial fear and hatred are likely to produce aggression”. Collingwood's idealist army might take the field too. But the present historian must be dogmatic, because he must be brief; must largely ignore the logical status of his explanation, in order to summarise a few generalisations that appear to rest on good evidence.

The Maori Wars against the British were a product of imperialism, or more specifically, of colonisation. The two more immediate causes were racial antagonism and socio-economic competition, though these may be separated only for the purpose of analysis and exposition, the latter being the material and rational aspect, the former the irrational aspect, of a single complex rivalry. Perhaps the subject may best be approached through the obvious fact that colonisation involved a direct competition for possession of the limited areas of easily cultivable land in the North Island, where most of the Maoris and Europeans lived. For the Maoris this was not an issue purely nor even primarily economic. The land of each tribe was its homeland. To increasing numbers of Maoris, the sale of land to the European Government amounted to selling their country. The land was the scene of the tribal traditions and the ancient legends on which their youth had been nurtured, their self-regard formed. And it seemed inextricably involved with the Maoris' future as a distinctive people. The loss of the land was paralleled by the decline in their population; it seemed doubtful whether, without it, they could anticipate any future worth thinking of. Though the settlers were not New Zealand patriots, to them, too, the land was more than an economic question, for the future of their communities depended upon acquiring it.

The Land Question

From the commencement of organised colonisation, in 1840, many Maori tribes opposed the sale of land. At every New Zealand Company settlement there was a threat of fighting, or actual bloodshed, as in the so-called Wairau “massacre” (q.v.), over disputed land purchases. That their conflicting interests over land were not the only cause of war between Maoris and British may be seen from Hone Heke's and Kawiti's rebellion at the Bay of Islands, 1844–46, which resulted largely from the sheer love of fighting of turbulent young men who were throwing off the influence of their elders. Though some of their grievances related to land questions, they seem to have been more worried about the cessation of land sales than about the danger of landlessness. The situation in the north differed considerably from that in the New Zealand Company settlements, where the rapidly increasing number of settlers seemed a menace. Many settlers were leaving the north, and the Maoris, who had become accustomed to European forms of wealth, and who had never feared the settlers, resented the poverty which followed British annexation. But it is significant that, even in this situation, the Maoris were agitated by rumours, deriving from reports of a debate in the British Parliament, that the Government intended to confiscate their lands.

A Maori anti-land-selling movement appeared in the 1840s and spread rapidly in the fifties, notably in Taranaki and the Waikato. A number of attempts were made in the early fifties to form leagues of tribes pledged to sell no more land, attempts unsuccessful because there was always a minority tempted by the thought of Government money. This movement coincided with a boom in agricultural prices, 1851–56, which brought prosperity to both races, and encouraged an increased rate of European migration. It was a direct threat to the interests of the settlers, who demanded more land when the Maoris were willing to sell less. The Government Land Purchase Department was led into underhand or “secret” purchases of land, news of which exacerbated Maori resentment. Maori sentiment against land sales was one of the main stimuli which in 1858 induced the Waikato, Taupo, and some other tribes to elect a King, Te Wherowhero, an old chief who now took the title of Potatau I. In the next two years he gained the adherence of the three Taranaki tribes. These Maoris acknowledged Potatau as their “King” and placed their lands under his protection, trusting that his mana would prevent their sale. Thus there was now indeed a Maori “land league”. But the King movement was more than that; it also represented a crystallisation of Maori national feeling.

Maori Nationalism

Evidence of the existence of mutual antagonism may be found from the early years of contact between Maoris and Europeans. The attitude of many educated and Christian settlers towards the Maoris was influenced by the evangelical doctrine of the unity of man, but it is plain that the majority imported with them assumptions of superiority over non-Europeans which were strengthened by misunderstandings arising from intercourse with the Maoris and changed to fear and antagonism by Maori resistance to settlement. That the Maoris felt a growing hostility to the settlers is equally clear from their letters and recorded sayings. J. E. Gorst in The Maori King (1864) gave vivid expression to the brute force of this feeling, when he wrote, “Men who are habitually told that they emit a disagreeable smell, are not likely to feel a strong affection toward the race that smells them”.

The Maoris in pre-European times had little (if any) sense of unity, and no word for themselves as a people. The word “maori” meant “normal”. They thought of themselves as members of tribes as distinct as European nations. A sense of nationality arose after the Europeans came, and led to the kotahitanga or “unity” movement, which joined with the anti-land-selling movement in inspiring the election of the Maori King. Maori nationalism was a product of contact with foreigners, but not, as in many parts of the world, of foreign rule, for the European Government had not seriously attempted to bring the bulk of the Maoris under European law and its penalties, other than by suppressing armed rebellion. Enlightened contemporary observers, like the Chief Justice, Sir William Martin, considered that the King movement was an attempt to introduce a political order to replace decaying tribal authority, which certainly was one motive of Wiremu Tamihana, its most distinguished leader. But his conclusion, that if the Government had governed the Maoris they would not have sought to create their own organisation, would not be accepted by many modern students, who are likely to judge, in the light of the history of nationalism since 1860, that more European interference with the native society would have stimulated, rather than prevented, Maori nationalism.

The King Movement

The loose federation of King tribes had little real political coherence and no effective institutions for cooperative action, but as the focus and symbol of Maori national feeling and resistance to land sales Potatau I was stronger than the Government was willing to believe. Official policy was to ignore him, in the expectation that his support would rapidly disintegrate. This did not occur, and the settlers soon came to regard him as a barrier to their purposes, an affront to their Queen, and a challenge to their Government. The Maori nationalists and the settlers, whose Ministers had since 1856 governed their domestic business, other than Maori affairs, under the system of responsible government, now had incompatible views of the future of the country, and had potentially conflicting political organisations. Two nations or one, the progress of colonisation or the conservation of Maori tribal society on its territories, were the alternatives presented by the coexistence of colonial ministry and Maori King. The situation had become very dangerous, and it was widely felt on both sides that war was imminent. The Maoris learned from the 1858 census that in numbers they were already inferior to the settlers. If they were to resist colonisation, the lesson was clear that they must do so soon. In Taranaki, where the Europeans had little land, there had been since 1854 a feud between the Maori land sellers and land holders in which the settlers longed to join. And while racial relations deteriorated, the Government had since 1856 been effectively paralysed by the rivalry of Governor and his officers on the one hand, the Ministers and the House on the other, to govern Maori affairs. Scarcely any attempt had been made to control the situation.

There is no need, in the case of the New Zealand wars of the sixties, to distinguish underlying causes and immediate occasion, for the latter directly arose from and exemplified the former. Nor is there space to relate details of the Waitara purchase: it must be sufficient to say that fighting began over an attempt by the Government to buy land, urgently needed by the settlers, against the wishes of the local chief, Wiremu Kingi, and the majority of his tribe. Kingi was not at that time a supporter of Potatau (though he joined his party when war began) but he opposed further land sales and the authorities believed that he was acting as the agent of a “land league” to prevent the rightful owners of the land from selling. For different reasons they were antagonistic to him, and determined to acquire the land, which the local settlers, who were openly hostile to Kingi, had long urged. Later investigations showed that what the authorities regarded as his “pretensions” were clear rights to a paramount voice in the disposal of the land.

The first campaign of 1860–61 in Taranaki was succeeded in 1863 by another which arose in part from the same situation. The Maoris held European land at Tataraimaka as security for the land at Waitara, which was occupied by troops. Sir George Grey reoccupied Tataraimaka before instigating an investigation of the title to the Waitara Block which convinced him that the Government had been in the wrong. Before he had induced the Ministers to agree to return the Waitara Block to its Maori owners, hostile Maoris had ambushed a party of troops near Tataraimaka. Having inflicted a severe defeat on the Taranaki “rebels”, Grey launched an invasion of the Waikato to put down the King party, which was the strongest centre of Maori disaffection. A long wearying war, which the Maoris appropriately called the “white man's quarrel”, had commenced.

• The Maori King, Gorst, J. E. (1864; 2nd ed. 1959)
• Sir George Grey, A Study in Colonial Government, Rutherford, J. (1961)
• The Origins of the Maori Wars, Sinclair, K. (1957; 2nd ed. 1961).

by Keith Sinclair, M.A., PH.D., Professor of History, University of Auckland.

THE CAMPAIGNS

1. Prelude: The Fighting Forties

New Zealand colonists had a foretaste of Maori fighting in the turbulent eighteen forties. The rash attempt of the European Magistrates to arrest Te Rauparaha and Te Rangihaeata for resisting the occupation of the Wairau precipitated the massacre of Captain Arthur Wakefield and his 21 companions (1843). Governor FitzRoy made himself very unpopular by blaming the colonists and refusing to punish the Maoris, but he averted a war that might have been calamitous in the feeble condition of the colony. Appeasement, however, damaged Government prestige, and provoked further disturbances. At the Bay of Islands, Hone Heke grew jealous of Te Rauparaha's reputation for killing Pakehas, and defied British authority, first by bullying the settlers, and then, incited by seditious Americans, by chopping down the flagstaff that bore the emblem of their enslavement, the Union Jack. He was joined by Kawiti whose young men clamoured for battle and booty. Fortunately, most of the northern Maoris remained neutral, and important chiefs like Nene, Patuone, and Rewa loyally fielded war parties against the rebels.

The war that followed (1845–6) consisted mostly of reverses suffered by the small British forces engaged, partially offset by successes of their native allies. The destruction of Kororareka (March 1845) and the heavy losses sustained in attacking Puketutu and Ohaeawai pas (May-July 1845) revealed the fighting qualities of the Maoris and the folly of British tactics. Governor Grey, who arrived opportunely in November 1845, quickly decided that the troops, though effective in the open when it came to bayonet work, should never be employed in hilly bush country unless supported by native contingents, under whose cover sappers could cut roads and gunners haul guns, permitting bombardment of the invested position before assault. These tactics were used against Ruapekapeka pa (January 1846). The approach and siege were well conducted, but the usual costly assault was avoided when the besiegers surprised the pa on a Sunday morning, which the defenders had naively imagined was dedicated to rest and prayer. The “victory” did something to restore lost British prestige, and Grey made a generous and lasting peace with the northern tribes.

The southern disturbances took longer to quell. Te Rangihaeata from his pa at Pahautanui, near Porirua, threatened both the coastal road north from Wellington and the Hutt Valley settlements; further north, the 200 settlers at Wanganui were at loggerheads with some of the local chiefs. Grey had only some 500 troops available, whom he dared not commit to the bush to pursue marauders, and he feared using loyal Maoris in case he encouraged tribal feuds. Till reinforced, he tried to play a waiting game, building roads and blockhouses, and winning friends by diplomacy. But murderous raids on isolated homesteads and skirmishes against military outposts (April-June 1846) forced the pace, and in July, after failing to come to grips with the main Maori forces, he seized the principal chief, Te Rauparaha, at Porirua and held him hostage for the good behaviour of the Ngati Toa tribe. The rebellion collapsed. Te Rangihaeata retreated to Manawatu, and half a dozen unlucky Maori captives were tried for murder and rebellion and punished as scapegoats for the rest. The justice of these proceedings was questionable, but they ended the insurrection with less bloodshed than pitched battles.

There was sporadic fighting at Wanganui (June-July 1847), following the Gilfillan murders, but peace was restored in February 1848, and the repurchase of the Wanganui Block removed the source of friction. Grey had vindicated his boast that murder and theft by Maoris would be punished and rebellion suppressed. He also persuaded them that the Government would treat them fairly and generously. On these terms peace prevailed till 1854, and Pakehas and Maoris had a breathing space in which to adjust their mutual relations.

2. The First Taranaki War, 1860–61

The situation deteriorated rapidly in the late fifties, till the fatal course pursued by Governor Gore Browne and his Ministers over the Waitara purchase led to the Taranaki War of 1860–61. The immediate issues were twofold – the right of the Maoris to refuse to sell their lands, and the sovereign authority of the Governor to maintain law and order in native districts. Unfortunately, the Governor, under colonial pressure, did not act impartially. Wiremu Kingi's protests against Teira's false sale were taken for sedition, and his rights were over-ridden without investigation. Kingi had committed no overt act of hostility when Lieutenant-Colonel Murray proclaimed martial law (February 1860). He and his people were driven by troops off the land they had occupied for the last 12 years, and were virtually forced into rebellion in self-defence. Waitara, in Maori eyes, became proof of Pakeha injustice, and Te Ati-Awa had the sympathy of all Maoridom and active support from other Taranaki, Waikato, and Wanganui tribes.

New Plymouth was garrisoned by 1,200 regular troops (chiefly the 65th and parts of the 12th and 40th Regiments) plus gunners and sappers, a naval corps, and some 500 or 600 colonial militia and volunteers. Reinforcements (including the 14th and 57th Regiments) brought the total to over 3,000. The Maoris never had half as many fighters in the field at any one time, but the nature of the country, broken by ridges and gullies, intersected by streams and swamps, and covered with fern near the coast and bush a few miles inland, gave the rebels many advantages. The outsettlers had to abandon their farms and stand to arms behind the town stockades; the women and children were evacuated to Nelson. Meanwhile, the Maoris ran amuck, burning houses and pillaging stock, and property worth over £200,000 was lost.

Military operations were again marked by inept command and faulty tactics. An early instance occurred when a mixed detachment of regulars and volunteers clashed with the Ngati Ruanuis near the Waireka Stream (28 March). Lieutenant-Colonel Murray withdrew the regulars and left the colonists to finish the fight, because Colonel Gold had ordered the troops to be back in barracks before dark. Fortunately Captain Cracroft with 60 seamen and marines made a diversionary attack, and the colonials withdrew with the loss of two killed and 12 wounded. Maori losses were about 50 killed. “The moral of all this,” wrote Henry Sewell, “is that the proper force to deal with the natives is the bluejackets and the settlers. Regular military tactics will not do for bush fighting.”

Gold blundered again when, after some trivial successes in capturing undefended pas and burning Maori food stores, he sent Major Nelson and 350 men to attack the strong pa of Puketakauere near Waitara River (27 June). Nelson, underrating his opponents, approached the pa without proper reconnaissance. It was winter time and wet, and the troops floundered in swamps and ditches under heavy fire from concealed entrenchments forward of the pa. Gold failed to send help, and the attackers were driven off by a tomahawk charge, leaving 31 dead and many wounded behind them. “Culpable imbecility or worse”, Sewell called it.

The elderly Major–General Pratt assumed command in August, the garrison was reinforced, and systematic operations were commenced to clear the coastal area between the Waitara and Waireka Rivers. Pratt's methods were slow but sure. He detested bush fighting and rash assaults on prepared defences, and adopted the patient siege tactics of the drill book. His “mile-a-month” technique excited the ridicule of the colonists – one report said, “The war at Taranaki maintains its peaceful course”. But the capture of Orongomai pa (October) showed that the Maoris disliked heavy shelling and grew uneasy as the sap approached their palisades; in fact, they made a hurried exit just before the sappers' mines blew up their stockades.

As the British grew cautious, the Maoris grew rash. A Ngati Maniapoto force had fought at Puketakauere and their exploits and plunder excited the envy of all the Waikato tribes. Another “Pakeha-shooting” expedition was dispatched under Rewi Maniapoto and Wetini, who, as soon as they arrived in Taranaki, rushed to the front of the battle and occupied the old ill-fortified pa site of Mahoetahi, about 7 miles from New Plymouth (6 November). Pratt threw a force of 600 men against them. The mistakes of the previous June were avoided; troops and volunteers skirmished their way competently through the swampy approaches. They then reformed near the earthworks, charged, and drove the defenders off the mound and back over the Waitara, inflicting about a hundred casualties for a British loss of four killed and 17 wounded.

This reverse only stimulated the Waikatos' thirst for revenge, and Auckland was more heavily garrisoned in case of attack. The Maoris, however, for the time being limited their actions to the Taranaki. Their main stronghold, manned by a thousand fighters, was a series of entrenched and palisaded positions at Kairau, Huirangi, and Te Arei, near the historic pa of Pukerangiora. Against these positions Pratt continued to advance his saps and trenches yard by yard, building redoubts and blockhouses as he went. Kairau fell after the heavy bombardment on 31 December, and then began the famous “long sap” towards Te Arei. On 23 January 1861, a picked Maori force tried to surprise the Huirangi No. 3 redoubt before dawn, but the attackers were held back in the ditches below the parapets, taken in the rear by troops from the adjoining redoubt, and slaughtered with bayonets, rifle fire, hand grenades, and short-fused shells dropped amongst them by hand. They lost about 50 killed and 40 wounded, while British casualties were five killed and 11 wounded.

Maori efforts to check the inexorable progress of the sap by filling it up at nights and assaulting the diggers by day slowed it but did not halt it. Wiremu Tamihana came down to Taranaki as peacemaker (12–14 March) but Pratt would not accept his mediation. Te Arei, however, was becoming untenable, and Hapurona hoisted the white flag (19 March). It was arranged that the Atiawa should submit to the Queen's sovereignty on promise that the Waitara question would be investigated, and the Waikatos were to return home and restore their plunder.

Fighting ceased but stalemate ensued. Kingi retired with Rewi to the King Country, the Waikatos would neither acknowledge the Queen nor surrender their plunder, nor did the Ngati Ruanuis yield. Gore Browne and General Sir Duncan Cameron, the newly arrived commander, considered invading the Waikato, but had to realise that they lacked sufficient troops for the task and that the lives of all the South Auckland settlers would be imperilled. Thus matters stood when Sir George Grey returned to New Zealand in September 1861.

3. Peace Proposals and Preparations for War, 1861–63

Grey's instructions were to make peace if he could, but if not, to wage war resolutely and end once and for all the pretence of Maori independence. The Premier, William Fox, approved the substance of Grey's plans for creating district and village runangas (assemblies), in which the chiefs, aided by European Magistrates, would enjoy a form of local self-government. But benevolence was balanced by calculation. The runanga scheme also envisaged road construction, individualisation of native land titles, and European settlement in native districts. Grey was reverting to his old idea of racial amalgamation, which most Maoris were now disposed to reject and which the colonists viewed without enthusiasm except on their own terms.

Moreover, Grey had to prepare for the possibility of war. The belligerent attitude of some elements amongst the Maoris and the fears (and hopes) of the colonists made this imperative. But his defence measures made his professions of peace suspect. “He maminga pea,” said Wiremu Tamihana – “Perhaps it's all humbug”. The advance of the Great South Road through the Bombay Hills, the positioning of troops at Te Ia and Queen's redoubt, and Grey's announcement that he would extend the road into the King Country and put bullet-proof steamers on the Waikato alarmed even well-disposed Maoris.

Rewi Maniapoto thought there was no “perhaps” about it. Te Paea, Potatau II's sister, said Rewi was “porangi” (madly incensed) and was doing his best to incite rows in order to start a war. He nearly came to blows with Naera to stop the building of the Raglan road; he caused a fracas at Kohekohe when the Government began building a courthouse there (March); and he expelled Gorst from Te Awamutu (April). He also manoeuvred to make the unsettled Waitara question a casus belli. Tamihana implored Grey to be patient, “to give him years”, and undertook to restrain Rewi. Whether or not he could have done so is doubtful. Grey was prepared neither to wait nor to surrender his function as keeper of the Queen's peace to Tamihana.

As soon as Auckland's defences were secure, Grey went to Taranaki and reoccupied Omata and Tataraimaka. Then he turned to Waitara, concluded that the purchase had been unjust, and, in order to remove a possible cause of war, proposed to return the land to its former owners. But Alfred Domett had replaced Fox as Premier, and while Ministers demurred, Rewi urged the Taranaki Maoris to violence. “Me patu te Pakeha” (“Kill the Europeans”), he wrote (15 April 1863), and dispatched a Ngati Maniapoto war party to forward that object. On 4 May Maoris of the Taranaki and Ngati Ruanui tribes, hoping to ambush the Governor himself, murdered eight officers and men at Oakura, a few miles out of New Plymouth. As the Kingite emissary Erueti said, “This is the work of all the Maoris for Waitara, and further trouble is at hand”.

4. The Maori Wars, 1863–72

Fighting recommenced in Taranaki on 4 June, when a sharp clash occurred at Katikara. But as British strategy hinged on the defence of Auckland, a strong garrison was left at New Plymouth and the main forces were concentrated in the north. All Maoris living in South Auckland were required to take oaths of allegiance and lay down arms, or else get out of the British zone. Cameron's troops crossed the Mangatawhiri, and on 17 July had their first brush with the Maoris at Koheroa. To justify this offensive, it was asserted that the Waikatos were on the point of attacking Auckland, but in fact the colonial Government was again, as in 1860, taking the initiative to extend its authority over Maoris hitherto outside the effective reach of the law.

Reinforcements brought the British strength up to 10 infantry regiments plus auxiliaries; the colonial militia was called out for local defence, and volunteer units of Forest Rangers were formed for more extended operations. Steps were also taken to recruit, chiefly from the Otago goldfields and Australia, some 3,000 military settlers, who were to occupy the conquered areas and guarantee future security. Land confiscation was already contemplated to punish the rebels and to defray part at least of the cost of the war. The General Assembly which met in Auckland in October endorsed this policy. F. A. Whitaker replaced Domett as Premier, and passed the harsh Suppression of Rebellion Act authorising martial law against suspects, the Settlements Act providing for confiscation, and the £3,000,000 Loan Act for war and other expenses.

Meanwhile, Colonel Carey's flying columns, aided by companies of Forest Rangers under Captain W. Jackson and Captain F. von Tempsky, cleared the Hunua Ranges of Maori guerillas, but not before the latter had made some enterprising attacks on the blockhouses along the Great South Road and on the villages of Pukekohe, Pokeno, Tuakau, and Mauku. Aided by two armoured gunboats, the Pioneer and the Avon, on the Waikato River, General Cameron at length turned the rebel defences at Meremere (31 October) and stormed the entrenched position at Rangiriri (21 November), capturing 183 prisoners, but losing 37 killed and 93 wounded. Ngaruawahia, the King's capital, was abandoned without further fighting and the Waikatos retired to Maungatautari.

In January 1864 Cameron resumed his advance up the Waipa, bypassed Paterangi where the Maoris offered battle, took Rangiaowhia by surprise, and occupied Te Awamutu and Kihikihi. Then occurred the famous battle of Orakau (31 March–2 April). Rewi Maniapoto and 300 followers, surrounded by 2,000 troops, defied their foes for three days and would neither surrender nor accept a safe conduct for their women and children. Only about a hundred of them, including Rewi, escaped to Hangatiki.

Orakau virtually ended the Waikato campaign, but the war was spreading like fire in the fern. Troops had been sent to Tauranga in January to block the flow of food supplies and reinforcements to the rebels. Their presence provoked skirmishes and ambushes, culminating in a costly British assault on Pukehinahina, Gate pa, when 46 officers and men were killed and 122 wounded. This reverse was avenged at Te Ranga (21 June), where Rewi Tuia and over a hundred of his Ngaiterangi warriors were killed, and the tribe submitted. In the Taranaki, sporadic fighting had gone on without much profit to either side – crop-burning raids by British flying columns, a series of skirmishes at Kaitoke (March), and a pitched battle at Sentry Hill (30 April). Of more sinister significance, Te Ua inaugurated the cult of Hauhauism. His devotees ambushed a small party of the 65th Regiment at Te Ahuahu (6 April), killed and mutilated the victims, and carried Captain Lloyd's head round the country as a prophetic emblem to incite the war fever. A Hauhau expedition against Wanganui was defeated by loyal Maoris in an extraordinary pitched battle at Moutoa Island (14 May).

Efforts to make peace at this time failed because Grey and his Ministers, Whitaker, Fox, and Thomas Russell were at loggerheads over the custody of the prisoners, the amount of land to be confiscated, and the terms of submission. Cardwell, the Secretary of State, authorised the Governor and General to settle these questions without the concurrence of Cabinet, whereat Whitaker complained that responsible government had become a farce, and resigned (November 1864). He was succeeded by F. A. Weld who, rather than tolerate British dictation of native policy, accepted the token alternative of colonial self-reliance, i.e., the withdrawal of British troops. But self-reliance meant heavy taxation, which the General Assembly was not prepared to sanction. The £3,000,000 loan had failed and the General Government had no money to pay for colonial troops, even if the manpower had been available.

In these inauspicious circumstances, it was proposed to launch a campaign against the Ngati Ruanuis and their confederates in the Taranaki-Wanganui area. General Cameron objected to this move, which he said was “bringing war into [a] hitherto quiet settlement” merely to gratify the colonists' lust for land, and did his best to defeat their purpose by go-slow tactics which earned for him the title of “the lame seagull”. His well-equipped force of 3,000 regulars, outnumbering the enemy by 10 to one, advanced 50 miles in 80 days, then stopped, leaving the principal enemy position, Weraroa pa, uncaptured. Colonial forces and their native allies achieved minor successes at Hiruharama or Jerusalem (March), Pipiriki (3 April), and Kakaramea (13 May). Exasperated at Cameron's obstructiveness, Grey, with his Ministers' full approval, came to Weraroa himself, and after failing to negotiate its surrender, took it with a small colonial and native force while the regulars stood by idle (21 July) – an episode which the Imperial Commander-in-Chief indignantly declared had “no parallel in our Colonial or General History”.

Weld's “self-reliant” policy collapsed when the General Assembly quibbled about voting additional taxes (October 1865), and E. W. Stafford took office, promising to reduce taxation and relying on the Governor to retain enough British troops to defend the country. An impossible situation arose. Cardwell had ordered five regiments home, and was demanding payment for the other five if they were retained. Stafford would neither pay for them nor raise a sufficient colonial force to replace them, leaving Grey in a quandary. Peace proclamations were issued, but they did not stop the war. The Hauhaus murdered the Rev. C. S. Volkner in barbarous fashion at Opotiki (2 March 1865); the crew of the schooner Kate were massacred at Whakatane (July); the Hawke's Bay and East Cape tribes rebelled; and the murder of Broughton and Kereti (September) showed that Weraroa had not pacified the West Coast. A mixed colonial and native force under Major W. Brassey fought a successful bush campaign in the Opotiki region against the Whakatohea and Urewera insurgents, and an Arawa contingent led by Major W. G. Mair campaigned in the Rangitaiki Swamp and captured Te Teko pa. At Hawke's Bay Major J. Fraser and Lieutenant R. Biggs campaigned against the Ngati Porou rebels in the Waiapu Valley and forced their submission (October 1865), whilst similar operations at Poverty Bay captured Waerenga-a-Hika pa near Gisborne, and drove the rebels back to Waikaremoana (January 1866). In the Taranaki-Wanganui sector, General Chute, who replaced Cameron in 1865, vindicated the prowess of British troops by a brisk campaign round Mount Egmont, covering 260 miles in 42 days and capturing seven pas and 20 villages (some of which belonged to friendly Maoris) and killing 50 rebels with little loss.

These successes, it was thought, might have enabled Grey to comply belatedly with Cardwell's demands for the return of the troops. Five regiments were in fact sent back between October 1865 and April 1866, but the remainder Grey thought were indispensable. Hauhauism had become a sort of Maori Fenianism, unpredictable and almost irrepressible. Ngati Ruanui and Tangahoe rebels were still active in the Patea area, despite Major T. McDonnell's bush raids on Pokaikai and Pungarehu (June, October 1866). On the opposite coast a Ngati Hineuru force tried to seize Napier but was intercepted by an improvised colonial force led by Colonel G. Whitmore, which killed over 30 and captured 88 prisoners. The latter, including Te Kooti, were deported to the Chatham Islands. Rumour had it that the Urewera, Taupo, and Waikato tribes were planning a joint rising. Fighting broke out again at Opotiki and Tauranga, and the Waikatos attacked the loyal Arawas at Koutu pa near Rotorua (March 1867).

In these circumstances, Grey had good grounds for holding on to his troops, and he interposed every possible obstacle in the way of Chute when he attempted to disengage them and get them embarked. His insubordination eventually brought a peremptory instruction from Lord Carnarvon (December 1866) suspending him from his functions as Commander-in-Chief and authorising Chute to direct troop movements irrespective of the Governor's sanction. Shortly afterwards, Grey was curtly dismissed and was replaced by Governor Sir G. F. Bowen (February 1868). Most of the troops left New Zealand in 1867–68; one regiment (the 18th) remained till January 1870.

Still, peace did not ensue. Titokowaru, a Hauhau chief of Patea, fell foul of authority over some stolen horses, took up arms and defeated Colonel McDonnell's ill-disciplined forces at Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu (7 September 1868), when von Tempsky and 19 others were killed. Whitmore attacked Titokowaru unsuccessfully at Moturoa (7 November), but later drove him back into the forests of the upper Waitara, where he lapsed into sullen quietude.

Te Kooti proved a more formidable and skilful opponent. Embittered by allegedly wrongful imprisonment, he escaped with over 300 fellow captives from the Chathams, landed south of Poverty Bay, and raised rebellion anew. He won his first encounter with the colonial forces at Paparatu (20 July 1868), skilfully evaded Whitmore's efforts to capture him, and gained a large following in the Wairoa and Urewera districts. On 10 November he made a murderous attack on the outskirts of Gisborne and massacred some 70 inhabitants. Pursued by Major Ropata and defeated at Makaretu (November-December) and Ngatapa (January 1869), he retired into the Urewera whence he launched more of his savage raids on the Whakatane and Mohaka settlements. Colonel Whitmore directed an elaborate three-pronged attack which drove him out of his forest fastnesses, and McDonnell thrice defeated him in the Taupo district, but Te Kooti, though several times wounded, miraculously avoided capture. A final expedition searched for him in the Urewera in May 1872, but he had taken refuge in the King Country, and there matters were allowed to rest.

Sheer exhaustion brought the fighting to a standstill. Alarms and excitements recurred in the next 10 years or so, and in particular a quarrel with Te Whiti in the Waimate Plains in 1879 nearly precipitated further hostilities. The situation was at last eased in 1881, when King Tawhiao made formal peace.

by James Rutherford, M.A.(DURHAM), PH.D.(MICH.) (1906–63), Historian, Auckland.

• C.O. and W.O. series in Public Records Office, London
• N.Z. Archives, Wellington;Miscellaneous MSS in Turnbull Library, Wellington
• Grey MSS Collection, Auckland
• England and the Maori Wars, Harrop, A. J. (1938)
• The New Zealand Wars, Cowan, J., 2 vols. (1922, 1955)
• Sir George Grey. A Study in Colonial Government, Rutherford, J. (1961).

THE EFFECTS OF THE WARS ON THE MAORI PEOPLE

“If the blood of our people only had been spilled, and the land remained, then this trouble would have been over long ago.” Ngapora Tamati, 1872.

The Maoris interpreted the wars of the sixties as a struggle for land. The beginning of the war in 1860 over the Waitara dispute, its resumption in 1863 over Waitotara, the invasion of the Waikato and the announcement of Government plans for the confiscation of the “rebels” land all helped to confirm their suspicions. Though volunteers from outside tribes often joined in, giving the Maori forces the semblance of a national front, the wars were mainly a series of pitched battles in which each tribe made a final, desperate stand on its tribal domain: Atiawa at Waitara, Waikato at Rangiriri, Ngati Maniapoto at Orakau, and Ngai-te-Rangi at Gate pa. In such circumstances defeat and perhaps death were honourable. No Maori patriot hesitated to fight to the last for tribal land. But for the survivors the future was clouded with bitterness: they had to endure confiscation, the permanent loss of their valued land. Many tried to avert the final catastrophe by prolonging the campaigns. Some accepted the delusion of Hauhauism – “a new and precious thing by which we shall keep our land” – and when this failed others, like Te Whiti's supporters in Taranaki, reoccupied confiscated land and passively resisted the European occupation. But the European victory was final. Time and numbers were on their side and the confiscated lands were gradually settled by European farmers.

Land Confiscations

Altogether 3,215,172 acres of Maori land were confiscated in the Waikato, Taranaki, and the Bay of Plenty. Of this area 1,341,362 acres were subsequently purchased or returned, mainly to “friendly” or “loyalist” Maoris. In confiscating the land, little heed was paid to the degree of “guilt” of the “rebels”, and it was noticeable that the best of the confiscated land was retained by the Government for European settlement. Some tribes like Ngati Maniapoto lost no land, though equally involved in the conflict with Waikato who lost almost all their land. Ngati Haua, who fought at Rangiriri, lost very little; and Ngai-te-Rangi, the defenders of Gate pa, had most of their land returned. This unequal treatment had its sequel in differing tribal attitudes after the wars. Ngati Haua and Ngai-te-Rangi surrendered and cooperated with the Government, only to sell most of their land recklessly within a few years. Waikato were irreconcilable but Ngati Maniapoto eventually agreed to the opening of the King Country (q.v., despite the intransigent opposition of Tawhiao and the Waikato Kingites.

After the wars the struggle for land entered a new and, in some respects, more dangerous phase. Under the Native Lands Acts of 1862 and 1865 the Crown's right of pre-emption was abolished, a Maori Land Court was established to individualise Maori land titles and European settlers were permitted to purchase land directly from the individuals named in the Court's orders. This was part of a wider policy designed to fulfil the promise of the Treaty of Waitangi to grant Maoris the rights and privileges of European citizens, including representation in Parliament. But it was the land legislation which had the most disastrous results for the Maoris who became involved. The legislation could not be introduced in the unsettled districts, and in any case King Party supporters would have nothing to do with land transactions; consequently it was the “friendlies” like Ngati Kahungunu of Hawke's Bay and the surrendered Ngati Haua, both possessing valuable pastoral land, who were first involved in land dealings. The upshot was that most of the land passed into the hands of European squatters, often in return for the debts incurred in taking the land before the Court. In Hawke's Bay a “Repudiation” movement arose in the seventies as the Ngati Kahungunu attempted to contest the transactions in the Supreme Court. This was unsuccessful; it was decided in the Courts and by a subsequent Commission that the transactions were sound in law. The Ngati Haua tribe was sadly divided by the transactions in land, one section dealing with Europeans the other adhering to King Party proclamations against doing so. In 1873, as a direct result of a land dispute, T. Sullivan, who was employed by a European purchaser, was murdered by the Kingite section of Ngati Haua. Land transactions were coming dangerously close to provoking a renewal of the war, and moreover the Maoris involved were paying a bitter price for their loyalty.

There were other dangers. Land transactions and the proceedings of the Maori Land Court gave rise to social and economic disturbances. Agricultural production declined as Maoris lived off the proceeds of land sales; tribes were divided as individuals defied chiefs to sell land and, prompted by interested Europeans, carried their disputes into the new arena of the Maori Land Court; and a wave of drunkenness and demoralisation swept over the districts concerned. Significantly, Maori population declined most rapidly in land-selling districts. The peace of the Pakeha was becoming more dangerous than his war.

The King Country

Where tribes could refrain from dealing with land, they escaped the social consequences. The supporters of King Tawhiao, by withdrawing behind the confiscation line and preventing European penetration, escaped for 20 years. Despite the bitterness over the confiscation this was no mere “sullen isolation” of “degenerate exclusiveness”. The agricultural production which had made the Waikato the granary of the North Island in the fifties was revived in the upper Waipa Valley. A considerable border trade emerged from 1868 and continued unabated until the opening of the King Country in 1885. The King Party traded grain, tobacco, hops, cattle, and pigs for European steel mills, agricultural implements, and clothing. Old forms of communal organisation and activity persisted though modified by the use of European implements and crops, and trade. A pacifist, predominantly Christian, religious cult, the Tariao (Morning Star) faith, emerged with Maori preachers taking over tasks previously performed by missionaries. As this tended to deify the personage of Tawhiao, it added social and political cement to the movement. The King Country became a kind of Mecca for hundreds of outside visitors who made an annual pilgrimage to attend King Party meetings. Here they took part in the traditional hakari, haka, and korero. The debates were mainly about land and usually ended with demands for the return of the Waikato and proclamations urging the tribes to refrain from selling land. The King Party was pursuing the pre-war policy of coexistence, territorially separate and politically independent, but cooperating with Europeans as far as this was possible without sacrificing land. The wars had in fact decided that Europeans were to be supreme but the King Party could continue in independence for some years because in 1869 Donald McLean had introduced a policy of pacification, instead of more war and confiscation. Although McLean and then Sir George Grey conducted a series of formal negotiations with the King Party in the seventies, in an effort to open the King Country to the Main Trunk railway and European settlement, failure was inevitable because the King Party would accept nothing less than the return of all the confiscated land as its quid pro quo. Nevertheless the slow but more certain activities of land-purchase agents and the Maori Land Court were gradually breaking down the unity of the King tribes. By the turn of the eighties some of the tribes fringing the King Country were beginning to deal with land independently and soon afterwards John Bryce, the Native Minister, was able to break the Waikato-Ngati Maniapoto alliance by persuading the latter to place their land before the Court. In 1885 Stout symbolically opened the King Country by turning the first sod of this section of the Main Trunk railway. A display of force by 200 militia was sufficient to prevent Tawhiao and the Waikatos from making more than a verbal protest.

Taranaki and the Urewera

In Taranaki a similar movement had been developing under the leadership of Te Whiti, who rallied the dispirited sections of the Taranaki tribes to his Parihaka settlement. Te Whiti was a biblical prophet but, unlike his atavistic Hauhau predecessors, a pacifist. His prophecies and the success of his followers in disrupting Government attempts to survey the confiscated Waimate Plains, provided a last ray of hope that the European occupation of the confiscated land could be avoided. This too proved a delusion. In 1881 Bryce sent 1,500 militia to Parihaka, arrested Te Whiti and his lieutenant, Tohu, and dispersed their followers.

With Te Whiti's resistance broken and the King Country open, there remained only one more large area under Maori control: the Urewera Country, home of Te Kooti's Ringatu followers. Inaccessible and bush clad, it held out little attraction for European settlers, but it was opened to surveyors in the mid-nineties. By the turn of the century communications had penetrated well into the interior of the North Island and behind these came the European settlers. Land transactions, particularly in the King Country, led to the same sort of social disturbances that had helped to further depopulation among the “friendly” tribes a decade earlier, although these were less severe in the King Country, because the Government prohibited private purchase of land and the sale of liquor.

The New Leadership

The failure of the King Party and Te Whiti to save the land meant that all hope of an independent Maori existence was doomed. The implications of the European victory in the wars had, by the turn of the century, become a matter of fact. It was difficult for the old wartime leaders to look forward from the grievances of war to an uncertain future in a predominantly European society, although Te Whiti made an effort to do so after his return from imprisonment. Maori leadership passed to a new generation, unconnected with the bitterness of war and confiscation. In the nineties a Young Maori Party emerged from a group of talented schoolboys of Te Aute College who subsequently went on to practice law and medicine among their own people and then turned to politics. They were the first to make effective use of the rights and privileges promised to Maoris by the Treaty of Waitangi and the legislation of the sixties. And before long they were able to persuade a predominantly European Parliament that positive Government aid was necessary if the Maori people as a whole were to make proper use of their rights and privileges. Ngata was responsible for the first real attack on the numerous tenurial knots which had developed from 40 years of legislation designed to individualise Maori land tenure, and for introducing a scheme to consolidate ownership. He made strenuous efforts to encourage Maori farming and eventually succeeded in obtaining Government assistance for land development. He persuaded the Urewera and the Waikato Kingites to adopt his land-development schemes, thus providing new hope for the tribes defeated in the wars. Pomare and Buck, both graduates in medicine, persuaded Maoris to adopt European remedies to combat European diseases. Their efforts coincided with and helped to further a slow but steady increase in Maori population.

The young leaders succeeded in promoting European ideas because they could do so within a Maori context: they were familiar with their own language and culture, men of both worlds who were just as effective on the marae as they were in Parliament. In later life both Ngata and Buck turned to studying and encouraging Maori and Polynesian arts and crafts. It was largely through the efforts of these men that the Maori rehabilitation of the twentieth century was both cultural and economic. This was also assisted by a more generous generation of Europeans who not only provided the financial means but also, as in the 1928 Royal Commission on Confiscated Lands, showed a willingness to admit to the errors of the past and make some effort to compensate for them.

by Maurice Peter Keith Sorrenson, M.A.(N.Z.), D.PHIL. (OXON.), Senior Lecturer in History, University of Auckland.

• New Zealand in the Making – a study of economic and social development, , Condliffe, J. B. (1959)
• Politics in a Small Democracy, (1961), Chapman, R. M. (ed.), “The Maori King Movement, 1856–1885”, Sorrenson, M. P. K.
• Jnl. of the Polynesian Society, Sep 1956, “Land Purchase Methods and their Effect on Maori Population, 1865–1901”.