Establishment of Representative Institutions

The first effective legislation to provide New Zealand with representative institutions is “An Act to Grant a Representative Constitution to the Colony of New Zealand” passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1852. Apart from dividing the country into six provinces with their own elected councils the Act also established a General Assembly of which the present General Assembly is a direct descendant. It consisted of the Governor, a Legislative Council, and a House of Representatives. Legislative Councillors were appointed for life by the Governor. Members of the House of Representatives were elected for five years or until the Assembly was dissolved.

The Constitution Act did not grant responsible government. In the first Parliament, which met in 1854 in Auckland, the House of Representatives therefore passed a motion praying for the “establishment of ministerial responsibility in the conduct of Legislative and Executive proceedings by the Government”. The prayer was granted in 1856 after a general election, the civil servants on the Executive Council giving way to Ministers supported by the majority in the House of Representatives. The Governor, however, still did not act only on Ministerial advice. In some matters his Instructions permitted him to make decisions without obtaining the approval of the Executive Council, either at his own discretion, or along lines laid down by the Imperial Government. There remained important limitations on the legal powers of Parliament until 1947. The successive removal of these limitations and the general decline of the Legislative Council are the two main aspects of parliamentary development since 1852.

Development of Parliamentary Sovereignty

The convention that the advice of Ministers responsible to Parliament be accepted was established by the demands and protests of successive Ministries. An indication that the convention had achieved some strength by 1867 was an amendment to the Instructions of the Governor requiring him to use his “own deliberative judgment” in the exercise of the prerogative of pardon. This instruction, evidently, had not previously been considered necessary. By 1892 the convention was yet more firmly established and such gubernatorial discretion was unacceptable to New Zealand governments. The Instructions were, therefore, further amended to bring the prerogative of pardon under Ministerial control, except when Imperial interests were affected. Since 1892 no instance of the rejection of Ministerial advice has become public.

In practice, there remained two relatively important survivals of dependent status in the relations between Governor and Parliament. First, the Governor, designated Governor-General after 1917, was in the position, anomalous under a British parliamentary system, of having from time to time to tender advice to his New Zealand Ministers at the request of another government, the Imperial Government. Secondly, he was appointed by the Imperial Government. Both of these matters were dealt with by Imperial Conference. At the Conference of 1926 it was decided to appoint representatives of the Imperial Government in the Dominions. New Zealand did not take advantage of this till 1939, but its effect, once adopted, was to leave the Governor-General as representative of the Crown alone. Then, at the Imperial Conference of 1930, it was decided that a Governor-General should be appointed on the advice of the Dominion government concerned. Today the conventions governing the relations between the Governor-General and Parliament in New Zealand are, in all important respects, the conventions which obtain in Great Britain between Monarch and Parliament.

The Legislative Council

The Constitution Act provided that the Queen might authorise the Governor to make such appointments to the Upper House, the Legislative Council, as she thought fit. As, however, interference by the Imperial Government in the appointment of Legislative Councillors was largely precluded by New Zealand's remoteness, the Governor's Instructions authorised him to make appointments without prior approval. The development of Ministerial responsibility in the exercise of this power was quite closely parallel to its development in other spheres. Appointments were being made on Ministerial advice by 1867. In 1868 an Imperial Act confirmed all previous appointments and placed the appointing power in the hands of the Governor. By the 1890s the convention was well established that in this, as in other matters, the Governor could not reject Ministerial advice.

The Act of 1852 had authorised the appointment of not less than 10 Legislative Councillors. No upper limit was fixed. The Bill originally introduced in the Imperial Parliament had provided that the Council be limited to 15 members, but this limitation was removed during its progress. Members of the Council were to hold their seats for life, though they could resign or be disqualified by bankruptcy, loss of citizenship, treason, or certain criminal offences. Governor's Instructions in 1855 fixed an upper limit of 15 councillors. The limit was raised to 20 in 1861 and removed completely in the following year. In 1866 the Council attempted to protect itself by passing a Bill limiting the membership to 38, but the Bill was dropped by the House of Representatives. A similar Bill was passed in 1868, but it met the same fate.

In 1891 the Legislative Council Act provided that all future appointments were to be for seven years, with eligibility for reappointment. This provision, combined with Ministerial responsibility for appointment and with the absence of any limit on the size of the Council, was all that was needed to accomplish its emasculation. Until the 1890s the Council had shown little hesitation in using its powers to amend or reject Bills passed by the House of Representatives. But a chamber which could be “packed” by men of the Government's choice and whose members were dependent on the Government for reappointment was not in a position to show the same independence. By 1947, when the National Party Opposition first introduced a Bill for the abolition of the Council, there was one proposition about which there was no disagreement: namely, that the Council had ceased to play a useful role in the process of government in New Zealand. It was in fact extremely doubtful whether it had done so for the past half century.

The Council had been under criticism for many years before 1947. A reform measure had been passed in 1914 providing for a Council of 40 members to be elected by proportional representation together with three Maori members who were to be appointed. The operation of this Act was postponed in ensuing years by Legislative Council Amendment Acts, the third of which, in 1918, provided that the Act would be brought into force at any time not less than a year after a Proclamation by the Governor-General for that purpose. Such a Proclamation was issued in January 1920, but was cancelled before it became effective. Until its abolition in 1950, therefore, the Council was a body whose constitution could be radically changed without its own consent. In spite of continued criticism of the Council, however, the Act of 1914 was never brought into operation. Moribund, the Council dragged out its existence until 1950 because it provided a useful form of political patronage.

Abolition of the Legislative Council

The Legislative Council Abolition Bill, introduced in August 1947 by the Leader of the Opposition, was defeated on second reading after doubts had been raised by the Attorney-General as to the competence of the New Zealand Parliament to give effect to such legislation. An Imperial Act of 1857 had given Parliament power to alter, suspend, or repeal any part of the Constitution Act except certain enumerated sections, one of which provided for a bicameral Parliament. The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 had given colonies in general the right to make laws altering their constitutions, provided such legislation was passed in the manner prescribed by law then in force in the colony. The question raised by the Attorney-General in 1947 was whether the Colonial Laws Validity Act gave New Zealand power to alter the sections of the Constitution entrenched by the Act of 1857. To resolve these doubts and to avoid any future questions about the legislative competence of Parliament the Government introduced, in September 1947, the Statute of Westminster Adoption Bill and the New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and Consent) Bill. Adoption of the Statute of Westminster, though it had no effect on New Zealand's competence to amend the entrenched clauses of the Constitution Act, did remove limitations on her power to legislate with extra-territorial effect and to make laws repugnant to British statutes. An Act of the Imperial Parliament was necessary to give New Zealand full power to amend the constitution, and the New Zealand Constitution Amendment (Request and Consent) Act requested and gave advance consent to such an Act. All the legislation involved was passed in 1947.

Following the defeat of the Opposition's Legislative Council Abolition Bill in the House, a Joint Constitutional Reform Committee was set up to consider the whole question of a second chamber. The Committee, after taking an enormous amount of conflicting evidence, was unable to agree on any recommendation. The Leader of the Opposition introduced another Legislative Council Abolition Bill in 1949, but it was opposed by the Labour Government and allowed to lapse. Evidently a severe strain might have been placed on party unity in a Legislative Council with a Labour majority asked to sign its own death warrant. In the election campaign of 1949 the National Party pledged itself to the abolition of the Council. National won the election and, a few days before Parliament met, announced 26 new appointments to the Council. The new councillors were quickly nicknamed the “suicide squad” by the Opposition. They all voted for the Abolition Bill which was introduced shortly after Parliament met. It had passed the House stages with only token opposition from Labour. It was passed by the Council with a majority of 10 votes.

The National Party had promised in the election campaign to consider, if it became the Government, alternative ways to safeguard the country from hasty legislation. A Constitutional Reform Committee was therefore set up to consider the question. The report was presented and considered in 1952. It recommended that a senate be created and empowered to delay legislation for two months. A total of 32 senators were to be nominated by the party leaders in the House in proportion to political strength. Senators were to hold their seats for the same period as members of the House of Representatives, except that they would continue to function as senators until the next senate had been appointed. They were to be eligible for reappointment. The Government took no action on the report.

The issue was forced on the Parliament elected in 1960. They inherited a petition, presented to the previous Parliament shortly before it was adjourned, praying for a written constitution for New Zealand and a second chamber of Parliament. The Petitions Committee held public hearings and reported that it had no recommendation to make. Members of the Committee from both sides of the House expressed their opposition to bicameralism in the debate on the report.

Neither of the two main parties in New Zealand now advocates the creation of a second chamber. Unicameralism, though it has not been without its critics, has produced only formal, politically insignificant, changes in the governmental process. While it cannot be said with any certainty that New Zealand will not revert to bicameralism, at present it seems highly improbable.

Powers of the House of Representatives

In 1962 the main constitutional restraint on the elected House is the need to submit all Bills for the Governor-General's assent. This is a formal, not a political limitation, since a Governor-General's refusal to sign a Bill would create or indicate a constitutional crisis. There are apparent limitations on Parliamentary sovereignty in the Constitution Act of 1852, which provide for reservation of any Bill for the Queen's assent and for disallowance by the Queen through Order-in-Council. These provisions remain on the Statute Book, but, by understanding reached at the Imperial Conference of 1930, are dead letters. In any case, they could be abolished by Parliament at any time without special procedures.

One presently effective disallowance provision is contained in a New Zealand Act (subject therefore to repeal by the New Zealand Parliament). The New Zealand Loans Amendment Act 1947 confirms an undertaking given to the Imperial Government that legislation which appears to the Imperial Government to damage the rights of holders of New Zealand Government securities will not be submitted for assent without the consent of the Imperial Government. As a result of this undertaking New Zealand Government securities rank as trustee securities in Britain.

A number of clauses in the Electoral Act of 1956 are entrenched by one of the clauses of the Act. The clauses relating to the duration of Parliament, the Representation Commission, the delimiting of districts, the franchise, and voting methods are enumerated, and it is required that no reserved provision may be repealed or amended except by a 75 per cent majority of the House or by a majority poll of the electorate. It is a general, though occasionally disputed, principle of constitutions on the Westminster model that one parliament may not bind another but it is impossible to say what the legal or political effect would be if a New Zealand Parliament were to ignore this attempt at entrenchment. As, however, the entrenching clause is not itself entrenched, a future Parliament could avoid contravening it by repealing it.

Evidently the real limitations on the powers of Parliament are political rather than legal. The New Zealand political heritage is the British political heritage, one which tends to inhibit governments as against drastic change of any kind unless they can be sure of popular support.

Parliament and Government

In the sovereignty of the elected House, in the electoral system, and in the procedure for arriving at decisions in Parliament can be found the rationale of institutionalised political behaviour in New Zealand. Pluralities in single-member constituencies elect representatives. A majority of representatives is necessary for parliamentary decisions. Because Parliament is supreme, governments have to be chosen for their ability to control decision making in Parliament. They must therefore be able to command the support of a majority. In conjunction with electoral requirements and, possibly, social factors, this need has been favourable to the growth of a two-party system. The growth of practices and conventions relating to the composition and responsibility of governments can largely be explained in the same terms.

The Cabinet System

Although Parliament is the supreme law-making body, legislative initiative comes, as in most democracies, from the Government. Being charged with the administration of law and having the information-gathering resources of the bureaucracy at its disposal, the Government is in the best position to suggest what changes in the law are necessary. For the same reason, and also because Parliament would otherwise be overburdened, much of the working out of the details of law is left to the Government, Parliament exercising the right to veto any aspect of such delegated legislation. The Government in New Zealand may be identified for legal purposes as the Executive Council, while in practice, by constitutional convention, Government policy is made by the Cabinet.

The Executive Council

The Executive Council is comprised of the Governor-General, who presides, and all the members of Parliament whom he has appointed as Ministers. The long standing convention that only members of Parliament should be appointed Ministers was given statutory recognition by the Civil List Act of 1950. The Act further provides that a person who ceases to be a member of Parliament cannot remain a Minister or a member of the Executive Council for more than 21 days. The method of selection of Ministers depends on party practice. The elected leader of the parliamentary National Party chooses his Ministers and assigns the portfolios. In the parliamentary Labour Party the number of Ministers to be appointed is determined and the required number is elected by the caucus. The previously elected parliamentary leader of the party then assigns the portfolios. The powers and duties of the Council are laid down in Royal Letters Patent and Instructions gazetted on 24 April 1919 and in statutes. Broadly speaking, Government regulations made under statutory authority are given legal effect by means of an Order-in-Council.

Cabinet

The Cabinet differs from the Executive Council in a number of ways. The membership of Cabinet may be smaller than that of the Executive Council, since a Minister without portfolio may or may not be a member of Cabinet, but will be a member of the Executive Council. The Governor-General is not a member of Cabinet. Informal discussion takes place in Cabinet in which national policy is determined for submission to Parliament and the activities of the various Government Departments are coordinated.

Collective Responsibility

The secrecy of these discussions is the basis of a collective responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament. The general agreements reached in Cabinet will be supported in Parliament by all Ministers in spite of any differences of opinion there might have been in Cabinet itself. Similarly, when Orders-in-Council are required to give effect to a decision of Cabinet, confirmation by the Executive Council is a formality and the Governor-General is not placed in the position of having to guide, and possibly influence, a lively political discussion. Cabinet responsibility is both collective and individual.

Individual Ministerial Responsibility

Individual responsibility, however, does not mean quite the same thing in New Zealand as it means in Britain. Ministers in New Zealand are far more ready than their British counterparts to accept responsibility for the activities of bodies acting in the general area covered by their portfolios. They will go much further in answering questions in Parliament about the decisions of ad hoc boards and other statutory bodies. This attitude is perhaps explained by the fact that evidence of maladministration or some other fault in a department is not usually regarded as warranting the resignation of the Minister concerned. Ministers, to summarise a now classic statement, regard themselves as “responsible, but not to blame”. A Ministerial explanation on such an occasion will not unusually refer to various civil servants who are to blame. Not surprisingly, civil servants very occasionally feel constrained to reply publicly to charges, or build up independent public support for themselves as a safeguard.

Cabinet Procedure

Though Cabinet discussions are informal they are governed by procedural rules. Cabinet delegates some duties to committees. The committees may even undertake certain executive action within the limits of established Government policy.

Any matter which a Minister desires to raise in full Cabinet can be brought before his colleagues at his initiative. Although the actual agenda is in the hands of the Prime Minister, a matter is normally brought before Cabinet by a Minister in a previously circulated Cabinet paper setting out the question on which a decision of Cabinet is required. Cabinet is provided with a small secretariat to whom such papers are handed and by whom they are distributed. The secretariat also serves the Cabinet committees. In discussions of Cabinet papers the Prime Minister or his deputy or the most senior Minister present is in the Chair. He endeavours to gauge the general opinion. As in British Cabinet meetings, it is not the practice to take a vote on issues. If there is no agreement on a recommendation embodied in a Cabinet paper a proposal may be rejected or amendments may be considered, or the matter may be referred to one of the standing committees of Cabinet or to an ad hoc committee specially appointed for the purpose. Whatever the decision, it is recorded by the Secretary of Cabinet, who is the head of the secretariat and the only person permitted to be present throughout Cabinet meetings, apart from Cabinet members. Occasionally, when advice is sought from a departmental head or other expert, he will be invited to attend while the business which concerns him is being discussed.

If a member of Cabinet has personal interests in a subject under discussion he is required to declare them and retire from the Cabinet room while a decision is being made. His absence is recorded.

Collective Responsibility and the Life of Governments and Parliament

The collective responsibility of the Cabinet, before Parliament, is part of the explanation of the conventions relating to Cabinet resignations, dissolution of Parliament, and parliamentary organisation and procedure. The Cabinet must be able to command a majority of votes in the House of Representatives in support of its general policy and, as a rule, of its specific proposals for the government of the country. A Cabinet which loses this support either resigns en bloc, or the Prime Minister asks the Governor-General to issue a Proclamation dissolving Parliament so that a general election may be held. The Governor-General's discretion in calling on someone to form a new Cabinet or in refusing a dissolution is crucially limited by the need to have his actions endorsed by a Ministry able to command a parliamentary majority. Since, in New Zealand, there are two main disciplined political parties contending for office, Cabinets are unlikely to lose their majorities in Parliament except as a result of deaths, resignations of members, by-elections, or because a general election reduces the representation of the majority party.

The Life of Parliament

The life of a Parliament can be terminated either by dissolution or expiry. The Constitution Act provides that the Governor-General may, at his pleasure, dissolve the General Assembly. Today, in this as in all other matters, he is bound to accept the advice of his Ministers while they have a majority in Parliament. A Parliament expires, under the Electoral Act 1956, three years after the day fixed for the return of writs at the previous general election. The Constitution Act of 1852 had fixed the maximum life of Parliament at five years, but the Triennial Act of 1879 provided for the three-year term which has been the rule since. The 1931 Parliament did pass a quadrennial Act but the 1935 Parliament restored the triennial system.

In practice Parliament is not normally allowed to expire. A few weeks before the expiry date the adjournment of the House is moved and a dissolution is requested during the adjournment. The total period which may legally be allowed to elapse between the end of a Parliament and the issue of writs for elections to a new Parliament is 10 days. The adjournment procedure provides members with a break before elections and brings Parliament to a planned end. Within recent years only one Parliament has been dissolved before entering its third year. The twenty-ninth Parliament was dissolved in 1951, after approximately 20 months, in order to obtain the verdict of the electorate on measures used in dealing with a major strike.

Before the 1956 Electoral Act a parliament had the undoubted power to extend its own life by statute. The parliaments elected in 1914, 1931, 1938, and 1951 demonstrated this. One can only speculate whether future Parliaments might feel inhibited by the 1956 Act from passing similar legislation unless supported by a 75 per cent majority.

New Zealand's experience cannot be said to have demonstrated the superiority of the triennial system over a quadrennial system. Expert legal, political, and economic opinion has frequently been expressed in favour of increasing the length of the Parliamentary term. In particular, it has been pointed out that deficit financing in election years has produced triennial economic crises and has helped to reduce New Zealand's rate of economic growth.

Size of the House of Representatives

There are 80 members of the House of Representatives – 76 Europeans and four Maoris. They are designated “members of Parliament”. Members who are serving on the Executive Council are also termed “honourable” and there is a convention that Her Majesty be requested to allow the title to be retained by a member who has served three years on the Executive Council. The number of members authorised by the Constitution Act was not more than 42 and not less than 24. The first Parliament, in 1854, comprised 37 members. Numbers were increased by legislation in the next two decades, European representation reaching its maximum in 1881 when there was provision for 95 members, including four Maoris. The Maori representation of four members was fixed in 1867 and has been retained in current legislation. The number of European members was reduced in 1887 to 70 and raised again to 76 in 1900, at which figure it has remained. Subject to certain disqualifications any registered elector, and only registered electors, may stand for Parliament. There are no residence qualifications, though, in practice, local candidates tend to be preferred by party selection committees.

Because New Zealand has a population of less than two and a half million, each member of Parliament represents approximately 25,000 people. By comparison with the United Kingdom, where the proportion is approximately one member per 80,000, the New Zealander is well represented. But the scope of Government activity is wide and throws a considerable burden on so small a number of members.

In 1965 the Electoral Act was amended for the purpose of stabilising the South Island electorates at 25. Those in the North Island would increase in accordance with population growth.

Payment of Members

In New Zealand payment of members first took the form of allowances under the Appropriations Act of 1870. This procedure continued until 1884 when the provisions were embodied in the Parliamentary Honorarium and Privileges Act, amended in 1887 to vary the basis of the allowance. In 1892 the Payment of Members Act provided for an annual sum in lieu of an allowance. Since the Civil List Act of 1950 salaries and allowances have been fixed by Order-in-Council on recommendation of a Royal Commission. An amending Act in 1955 provided that a Royal Commission for this purpose be set up within three months after every general election. Under the current (1964) Parliamentary Salaries and Allowances Order, the Prime Minister has a salary of £5,750 and a tax-free allowance of £1,600. Ministers holding a portfolio have a salary of £4,000 and an allowance of ££550. Ministers without portfolios receive £3,250 salary and an allowance of 450. The Speaker's salary is £3,400 and his allowance is £425. The salary of ordinary members is £2,150 and they have an allowance of between £450 and 725, depending on the classification of the electorate from urban to rural. Other payments and financially valuable privileges in connection with official duties, accommodation in Wellington while Parliament is in session, and travel are also received by members. There are certain deductions for non-attendance.

Superannuation Scheme for Members

A contributory superannuation scheme for members was introduced in 1947. The scheme now provides for a minimum retirement allowance of £350 for a member who has served for the whole of three Parliaments. This is increased by £50 per annum for each year of additional service, rising to a maximum of £700 per annum after 15 years' service. An ex-member must be 50 years of age before he qualifies. The widow of a member is entitled to an annuity of two-thirds of the retiring allowance to which her husband was entitled at the time of his death.

Royal Commission on Parliamentary Salaries, 1964

The 1964 Commisson on Parliamentary Salaries has presented its report, and the recommendations are set out in the table below. Apart from recommending a substantial salary increase all round, the report included a number of important innovations, such as the addition of the Ombudsman to the parliamentary salaries' group; provision of a pension (maximum £1,000 per annum) for former Prime Ministers who have served two years in that office, together with a special provision for their widows. Travelling allowances for Ministers' wives have been liberalised and more clearly defined. Both the Speaker and the Leader of the Opposition have had their travelling allowances extended and brought into line with those of the Ministers. In the table below, “salaries” are subject to the normal social security and income taxes while “allowances” are tax free. Although the parliamentary salaries and allowances are subject to annual appropriation, they do not appear as a single group in the Estimates. The “salaries” group appears as a permanent appropriation under the Civil List Act of 1950. Most of the travelling allowances authorised by this Act, together with such items as ministerial staff, private secretaries, and some special or extra allowances, appear on the Ministerial Division of the Internal Affairs Estimates. Travelling allowances of the Governor-General, and the expenses previously covered by this “allowance” and “extra allowance” are shown on the Miscellaneous Services Division of the Internal Affairs Estimates, while the upkeep and maintenance of the two Government Houses are included in the Public Buildings Division of the Ministry of Works Estimates. The Legislative Department Estimates cover the members' and members' wives travelling allowances, as well as most of the minor items — postage stamps, special telegram rates, Speaker's and Leader of the Opposition's car hire, and railway concessions for members' families.

Royal Commission Personnel

The following Commissioners have served since 1950, when the scheme was instituted:

Meeting of Parliament

Parliament is summoned by Proclamation issued by the Governor-General. The three-year life of any Parliament is divided into sessions. The length of sessions varies but a session normally starts in June and ends in November or late October. A short early session in April is sometimes called to pass special legislation or to pass an Imprest Supply Bill. The latter enables necessary supplies to be granted and the beginning of the ordinary session to be postponed so that Ministers can attend conferences or other official engagements. A session is terminated when Parliament is prorogued by Proclamation issued by the Governor-General.

Times of Sitting

The normal sitting days of the House are Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. From Tuesday to Thursday the House meets at 2.30 p.m. and continues to sit until 5.30 p.m. Business is resumed at 7.30 p.m. and continues until 10.30 p.m. On Fridays the House sits from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 4.30 p.m.

Quorum

A quorum is constituted by 20 members including the Speaker.

Organisation and Procedure

The organisation and procedure of the House of Representatives is intelligible in terms of the functions the House is required to perform. It deliberates and criticises legislative proposals coming from the Government; it exercises a general supervision over and check on the Public Service; and it represents the hopes and grievances of the electorate to the Government. In its performance of the first of these functions Parliament is assisted by legislation conferring privileges which protect freedom of debate, and by Standing Orders which provide for the appointment of officers of the House to enforce rules of debate and of procedure on Bills.

Privilege

The supremacy of Parliament and its effectiveness as a deliberative, critical assembly depend on its not being subject to interference by the other branches of Government. The privileges of Parliament enable it to perform its functions free from such interference and make it possible for Parliament to take measures against those who offend in this respect.

Privileges in New Zealand, though they are claimed by Mr Speaker ceremonially before the Governor-General at the beginning of each Parliament, rest upon statute. In the Parliamentary Privileges Act of 1865 it was provided that both Houses were to enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and powers as were then enjoyed by the British House of Commons. Privileges include a limited freedom from arrest, freedom of speech in Parliament and for publication of parliamentary proceedings, freedom of access to His Excellency by the House as a whole through Mr Speaker, and the right to demand a favourable construction on proceedings of the House. Of these the most important today is a member's absolute freedom of speech in debates.

Officers of the House

The presiding officer of the House is Mr Speaker. He is elected by a new House as soon as the members have been sworn. He maintains order in debate in the House and sees that the rules of procedure are properly followed. He is empowered to name members who are disorderly and move their suspension or he may order their withdrawal for the remainder of a sitting. In his absence, or when the House is in committee, the Chairman of Committees, who is also elected by the House, presides. The Speaker is generally non-partisan in the discharge of his duties, but his position is not as unambiguous in this respect as is the British Speaker's. He is normally opposed in his electorate. He retains his party membership and may be quite active in party affairs. The convention that a Speaker, if re-elected, remains in office in spite of a change of government, has not established itself here. There have been only three occasions in this century, in 1928, 1950, and 1961 when, following a change of government, the opportunity to re-elect the Speaker has presented itself. Only in 1928 was the previous Speaker re-elected, and the man in question, Sir Charles Statham , was an Independent. In spite of these factors and in spite of the fact that the Speaker's dignity is less carefully maintained by ceremony and pomp than in the House of Commons in England, the Speaker is impartial, but not so impartial that governments do not ensure that his powers are exercised by someone likely to cooperate in the dispatch of business. The Speaker does not take part in debates or vote while he is in the Chair, though he has a casting vote in the case of a tie. Speaker's Rulings have established that his casting vote shall be used to advance a Bill a stage further if this gives the House another opportunity to express its opinion or to preserve the status quo. Both Speaker and Chairman of Committees normally refrain from exercising a deliberative vote when not in the Chair, but narrow governmental majorities sometimes make this restraint impossible.

Rules of Debate

The rules of debate are designed to ensure that deliberation is calm and rational, not blinded by emotion and the introduction of personalities and offensive expressions. To this end members are required to address themselves to Mr Speaker and not to each other, and to rise and speak only when called upon by the Speaker or his deputy. A member may not refer to another member by name or malign or abuse him. In practice, debate in the House of Representatives is not marred by scenes of great disorder. There are, nevertheless, frequent interjections from seated members and occasional verbal battles which degenerate into acrimony before they are checked by Mr Speaker. On such occasions Mr Speaker's party affiliation is an impediment to him, particularly if the main offender is from the Opposition party.

Curtailment of Debate

The responsibility of the Government and the proper performance of Parliament's own critical function have, in spite of the small size of the House, necessitated the adoption of rules to prevent obstruction and to secure the swift passage of urgent business.

Time Limits on Speeches

These were first imposed in 1895. Before 1962 the time allowed was very generous. Each member was allowed 60 minutes on the Budget, and 30 minutes on the other major debates. Because members seemed to feel it incumbent on them to speak to the maximum of their time limit, the rule was changed in the 1962 revision of Standing Orders reducing Budget speeches to 30 minutes and other major debates to 15 or 20 minutes. Time limits on other debates were correspondingly reduced.

Urgency and Closure

Standing Orders give Government business precedence, with a few exceptions, at all sittings of the House. An urgency rule for a specific item of Government business dates from 1929. Urgency may be moved by a Minister without notice and without debate, except for a brief explanatory statement by the mover. If urgency is granted the Bill or other matter may be discussed immediately and dealt with completely at that sitting. A Bill can thus be taken through all its remaining stages, the sitting going on until they are completed, irrespective of normal hours for the close of business. Used in conjunction with the closure rule which became part of Standing Orders in 1931, this enables a very rapid dispatch of business and it has consequently not been found necessary to introduce the kangaroo or guillotine closure as in the British House of Commons. The closure rule allows any member to move “That the question be now put” and it is decided without amendment or debate. Check on the abuse of closure procedure is provided by the Speaker, who has power to refuse to put the motion.